THE CONTRASTING EFFECTS OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE

ON IPO FIRM UNDERPRICING IN A DEVELOPING CONTEXT
Introduction
A dominant feature in agency theory associated with the mitigation of asymmetric information costs between principals (owners and investors) and agents (incumbent management) is the role ascribed to the board of directors in aligning interests of these two groups. Board structure and composition is a key feature in ensuring the mitigation of these costs through optimal monitoring and surveillance of management and the alignment of interests with those of shareholders (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002) . However while this shareholder agency model has come to dominate governance best practice and legislation in UK and US markets, thereby commonly termed as Anglo-American, a rival stakeholder model, viewing the firm as a social entity responsible and accountable to a wide variety stakeholders encompassing suppliers, owners, customers, employees, management, government and local communities, is more prevalent in non-Anglophone markets and termed as European (West, 2006) . However both models have an incongruous fit when adopted and applied in societies with very different social values and norms, such as those commonly found across Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) where prescriptions are largely at odds with the communitarian nature of indigenous culture (West (2006) ; Platteau (2007) ; Englebert (2000) ). As a consequence we are motivated to focus our study on SSA region which is characterised by indigenous societies with often alien cultures, values and social norms to those engendered by neoclassical markets-orientated institutions and the AngloAmerican model of governance.
An initial public offering (IPO) represents the first major liquidity event in a firm's lifecycle with insiders realizing value from the sale of their equity stakes and consequent diversification of ownership (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002) . It also provides a window through which the neoclassical institutions of the market can value the firm thus facilitating insiders to realize potential value through an opportunity to initiate investment exit strategies for the first major time during the firm's life cycle (Bruton et al, 2009 ). Underpricing of newly issued stock at IPO is a critical measure of the value the market attributes to the firm and is representative of the value attributed to board level characteristics that mitigate asymmetric information and align the interests of principals and agents. However governance across developing regions such as SSA is commonly shaped by the interplay between formal institutions such as legal codification and legislation, adoption of international best practice recommendations and much deeper and pervasive informal institutions enshrined in the values and behavioural norms of the indigenous society itself (Williamson (2000) ; North (1991) ). The successful adoption of transplanted legal and governmental institutions inherited from former colonial metropoles is hinged on the cultural compatibility of these institutions with the deeper informal institutions of the indigenous societies. This is particularly evident in the very different economic performance of countries across the SSA region ranging from the successful adoption and cultural compatibility of English common law and neoclassical institutions in Botswana (Hjort, 2010) to the lack of reception and incompatibility of inherited institutions across much of the rest of SSA (Joireman (2005) ; Englebert (2000) ; Platteau (2007) ). However a major feature in terms of the adoption and in particular enforcement of formal institutions is the lack of an effective and commercially trained judiciary and an incomplete body of case law and legal bureaucracy in the case of civil code countries (Joireman, 2005) together with often undercapitalized regulatory enforcement agencies (Quintyn and Taylor, 2005) . However the greatest challenge to the successful adoption of the Anglo-American or European stakeholder model of governance is from the indigenous society cultural and social values and norms engendered by the South African term "ubuntu". This ubuntu concept of development signifies a commitment to coexistence, consensus and consultation where indigenous elders rule by consultation with all stakeholders rather than by direct authoritative means (Rossouw (2005); West (2006) ). This value system undermines the values and goals envisaged by the Anglo-American model as it renders the exclusive focus on shareholder's interests impossible owing to the necessity of equal consideration of values such as coexistence, concesus and consultation that are central tenets of ubuntu philosophy (West (2006) ; Rossouw (2005) ). The combination of ubuntu philosophy and African values together with often very strong ethnic allegiances which themselves are enshrined in informal institutions ranging from language to cultural and societal beliefs and behavioural norms in addition to alienation from inherited colonial era institutions engendering economic and social outcomes at odds with those of the underlying societies (Englebert (2000) ; Joireman (2005) ) creates significant challenges in terms of best practice governance in terms of optimal board structure and independent monitoring mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ; Fama and Jensen (1983) ; Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) ). This paper examines IPO underpricing in a comprehensive sample of IPO firms from across the Sub Saharan African (SSA) region excluding South Africa. This region is particularly interesting as political economies and formal economic activity are dominated by social elites (Lavelle (2001) ; Hearn and Piesse (2009) ) while there exist sharp differences between governmental and legal institutions in French and Portuguese civil code as opposed to English common law countries (La Porta et al (2008); Joireman (2001) La Porta et al, 2008) ). SSA markets have also benefitted from active encouragement by local governments influenced by market-orientated policies of the international financial institutions and structural reform packages (Hearn and Piesse, 2009) geared towards the attraction of foreign investment capital. Equally many markets have adopted and revised regulatory and governance legislation in line with international best practice and following that of the UK Cadbury Report, US Sarbanes-Oxley, South Africa's King I and II reports and OECD guidance principles. As such we combine agency and IPO signalling perspectives to study the impact on IPO underpricing arising from the adoption of various board-level governance mechanisms as well as from board diversity with directors being either from foreign or more specifically OECD countries or being high profile figures in the indigenous local society. Signalling research suggests that underpricing can be reduced by idiosyncratic signals through which IPO issuance investment banks convey information about the firm's quality to outside external investors (Sanders and Boivie, 2004) .
In contrast the agency-based viewpoint looks on these signals as being associated with the firm's intrinsic ownership structure and governance roles of boards envisaged as part of their structure and composition (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002) .
This paper extends the study of IPOs in three major ways. The first studies the differences in the signalling effects from the adoption of governance measures (establishment of nominally independent committees, board size and board independence). The second contribution is in the study of the signalling effects arising from the composition of the board with consideration of directors from foreign, and specifically OECD governance jurisdictions, as well as high profile society positions in indigenous local society. The third contribution is associated with the study being undertaken in one of the poorest world regions and in one dominated by indigenous societies that have had to adopt often alien formal institutions from former colonial metropoles. Furthermore many countries in this region are characterised by narrow formal economies dominated by either agricultural or extractive industries and exhibit sharp differences between civil code law and common law institutions inherited from former Portuguese, French and British colonial metropoles. These differences are particularly important in determining firm capital structure (La Porta et al (2002 , 2008 ) as well as in the protection of property rights over a financial security's entitlements to corporate cash flows (La Porta et al, 2008) and private benefits of control (Boulton et al, 2009 ). Extending the study across a wider range of institutional environments facilitates the extension of the study of agency and signalling theory in application outside the study of the United States and UK which are common in the literature (Bruton et al, 2009 ).
Agency-based perspectives on the roles of board-level governance measures generally propose the separation and independence of roles, committees, monitoring and surveillance bodies. There is a considerable literature regarding the reduction of asymmetric information from the necessity of independence in oversight and monitoring of board activities a higher number of truly independent non-executive directors is likely to reduce asymmetric information. As such we conjecture that board independence ratio is negatively related to underpricing. There is a larger literature concerning the role of nominally independent board committees in their ability to provide effective monitoring and oversight. Downes and Heinkel (1982) question the additional benefit of committees over and above the role of independent directors in the oversight of board level decision making. Furthermore Anderson and Reeb (2004) and Golden and Zajac (2001) question the true level of independence and impartiality of committees from the influence of CEO and executive directors while Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) find evidence that both non-executive directors and committees are largely selected by incumbent executive board members. Turley et al (2004) find that the formation and reliance of firms on independent audit committees actually cause net increases in agency and monitoring costs. However owing to a lack of consensus in the literature we conjecture that the establishment of board committees will reduce informational asymmetry and underpricing. Finally the board of directors itself can be viewed as a tool that is useful in mitigating asymmetric information with larger boards being more dispersed and incurring greater coordination costs than smaller counterparts where communication is engendered. As such we conjecture that increases in board size will be positively related to increases in underpricing reflecting this asymmetric information cost from poorer coordination. However the composition of the board itself is a vital tool in both mitigating asymmetric information and in signalling quality in terms of both the additional human capital foreign directors can bring with them as well as their overseas networks (Cohen et al, 2008) . In the light of neoclassical market institutions the increased presence of foreign and in particular OECD origin directors would be perceived as maximising firm value and thus minimising potential misalignment of interests between investors and incumbent management. As such we conjecture that the presence of foreign and in particular OECD directors will reduce levels of underpricing. However quite the opposite is true with increasing numbers of high profile figures from indigenous society as these are more likely to be closely linked to alien local society interests and thus at odds with external market investors. As such we conjecture that the presence of high society directors will increase levels of underpricing in line with increases in agency costs through potential for misalignment of interests and greater asymmetric information.
This paper is structured as follows: The next section outlines hypothesis construction and details the model used while section 3 introduces the data and outlines SSA regional markets. Section 4 provides the empirical results while the final section concludes.
Hypotheses and Model
This study is focussed on the performance effects of IPO firms from a variety of corporate governance mechanisms, namely establishment of independent committees, board size and proportion of board independence, or otherwise known as level of non-executive independent directors to incumbent executive directors. In addition the contrasting effects of foreign, and in particular OECD, and indigenous high society directors are studied in the context of additional networks to enhance firm value but within the unique context of conflicting informal and formal institutions between indigenous society and governance legislation.
Dependent variables
Underpricing
Initial returns are used as a measure of underpricing. This is calculated over a period of 2 (and 4 weeks) following listing on exchange. This is due to concerns over the severity of illiquidity in Sub Saharan Africa's equity markets causing price-rigidity (Smith and Jefferis (2005) ; Hearn and Piesse (2010) ) that in turn would inhibit the movement of prices in relation to their ability to reflect order flow and information (O'Hara, 2003) . In line with Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) underpricing is calculated as the difference between stock price at 2 (and 4 weeks) and the issue price divided by the issue price:
2.2. Board structure and composition effects on IPO firm performance
The mainstream international corporate governance literature views an IPO as being the first major "liquidity event" in the life cycle of fast growing firms when founders and initial investors (corporate insiders) begin the process of realizing the value of their ownership stake in the firm (Brav and Gompers, 2003) . However the IPO process introduces a number of potential agency conflicts for the various principal and agent parties involved (Bruton et al, 2009 ). Adverse selection and moral hazard problems arise from the asymmetric information between new owners (investors) and incumbent managers (agents) as there are incentives for the latter to mislead or even worse expropriate the former (Bruton et al (2009); Boulton et al (2009) ). As such the board of directors itself can be viewed as being a tool which can act to better align incentives of various principals and agents and facilitate communication and information disclosure thereby reducing asymmetric information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . The literature regarding the beneficial impact arising from firms establishing independent board level committees to oversee effective information disclosure, executive remuneration and monitoring is more diffuse in its findings. Daily (1995) and Dalton et al (1998) detail how the majority of corporate decision-making is not undertaken through the committees but rather by the board itself while Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) question the independence of committees from CEO control. However given that the establishment of committees with at least nominal independence is a costly process for firms and is recommended in best practice governance guidelines in OECD and Cadbury Report I conjecture that the signalling of quality role of committee establishment will reduce underpricing and costs of equity while being associated with better capitalized, larger value firms that are able to implement these costly procedures. Consequently we test the following hypotheses:
H1. Establishment of committee(s) is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing
The literature regarding the impact of board size on firm performance is largely derived from Jensen (1993) where smaller boards were argued to be the result of technological and organizational change that facilitates reduction of costs and corporate downsizing. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) found evidence suggesting that smaller boards are more effective than large boards as agency costs increase owing to a greater number of board members adopting the role of free-riders. Jensen (1993) found further evidence for the lack of cohesiveness in large boards leading to a lack of coordination and communication that reduced the effectiveness of the board as a monitoring tool in the reduction of agency costs. As such I conjecture that larger boards to be in larger firms with higher value and incurring higher levels of underpricing and cost of equity. Consequently we test the following hypotheses:
H2. Board size is positively associated with IPO-firm underpricing
The literature regarding the impact of board independence commonly focuses on the monitoring role engendered by non-executive directors over incumbent executives which in turn mitigates informational asymmetry and reduces underpricing (Chahine and Goergen, 2009 ). Chahine and Goergen (2009) find empirical evidence that higher levels of board independence leads to lower levels of underpricing. Consequently we test the following hypotheses:
H3. Board independence is negatively associated with IPO-firm underpricing
More recent research suggests that the connectivity and networks of individual directors who make up the composition of the board effect the value of the firm (see Certo et al, 2001 ). Higgins and Gulati (1999) reveal evidence that the greater the collective number of outside links associated with the members of the board the stronger the signal of the firms quality and greater alignment of interests between outside investors and management (Cohen et al, 2008 
where performance is dependent variable relating to underpricing at 2 and 4 weeks respectively as defined in preceding section. Committee is a dummy variable taking value 1 if condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise. Log Board size is the natural logarithm of the total number of both executive and non-executive directors and is taken to include those 
Sub Saharan African securities markets
There are considerable differences between Sub Saharan Africa's stock markets with the greatest of these being between markets adhering to common as opposed to civil code commercial and regulatory law. However all markets are characterised by narrow political economies controlled by social and political elites (Lavelle (2001) ; Hearn and Piesse (2009)) and only a handful of brokerage firms and indigenous investment banks with minimal trading activity. The lack of an established domestic institutional investor community in many of the markets combined with poor infrastructure create further difficulties in attracting much needed foreign investment (Hearn and Piesse (2009) ). An additional issue arises from trading activity occurring outside the formal exchanges with only the pre-agreed details being acknowledged during designated trading sessions as is the case in Ghana (Akotey, 2008) .
The evidence in Table 1 detailing the sample structure reveals the more sporadic nature of listings across the region. Listings activity on the BRVM acting as the West African Francophone regional exchange is largely static during the sample period with notable exceptions being Onatel, the Burkina Faso telecommunications operator, two Bank of Africa affiliates from Niger and Benin, and a local Ivorienne firm. This regional focus to the listings on the otherwise inactive market (Lavelle, 2001 ) is largely the result of political pressure and a marketing drive designed to enhance the regional focus of the market (Hearn and Piesse, 2010) . It is also facilitated in practice by the extended regional network of Table 1 4. Results
Descriptive statistics
The evidence from Table 2 reveals considerable differences between civil and common law markets across Sub Saharan Africa in terms of levels of undepricing with the former having a mean discount of 5.5% in contrast to the latter of 39.10%. Standard deviations in mean underpricing are also substantially larger across common law markets than in their civil code counterparts reflecting a greater dispersion of firms listing and raising external capital. This is in line with the findings of Levine (2005) and La Porta et al (2008) with evidence of a lack of a external market-based culture in civil law countries and consequently greater emphasis on bank-based and internal finance. This is further reflected in the mean listing size across civil code markets (US$11.07m) which is eight times lower than that of common law markets (US$80.66m). However there is also a considerable contrast in the size and development of markets across common law countries with the mean amounts raised being highest in Kenya and Nigeria with the latter being more than ten-times the mean value raised in its smaller common law neighbour of Ghana.
Table 2
The evidence from Table 3 reveals both low levels of correlation across variables within the sample and a general lack of statistical significance of the correlations that do exist. This would infer that multi-collinearity is not a significant concern for this sample in the ensuing regression models. Table 3 4.2. Impact of board governance attributes on IPO firm underpricing
The evidence from Table 4 reveals that board size has a sizeable, positive and statistically significant relationship, albeit at a meagre 75% confidence level, with underpricing at both 2 and 4 weeks between models 1 and 2. This is intuitively expected given the evidence in the extent literature regarding the negative impact of larger sized boards in terms of poorer coordination and inefficient communication and ability to exert control over incumbent management which acts to exacerbate agency costs and underpricing. This is also consistent with hypothesis 2. The evidence from models 5 and 6 reveal that there is a very large, positive and highly statistically significant, at 95% confidence level, relationship between establishment of audit, finance and remuneration oversight and surveillance board committees and underpricing. This is not expected and is inconsistent from the propositions in hypothesis 1, itself formed from the theoretical antecedents of shareholder, and specifically agency, theory. However this would be more consistent with the essentially neoclassical institutions of the market requiring price premiums, i.e. underpricing, owing to a lack of confidence in the establishment of such committees which are unlikely to be effective in the light of dominant informal institutions enforced by alien African, or ubuntu-type, values to those engendered by the Anglo-American model of governance. The evidence regarding board independence is inconclusive as while the relationship between this and underpricing if positive it is not statistically significant at any discernable level of confidence.
In general the evidence across all models in Table 4 regarding the relationships between control variables and underpricing reveals that there is a large, positive and statistically significant relationship between basic materials and construction industry dummy and IPO price premiums. This indicates that underpricing and agency costs are more prevalent in the extractive industries that are often state controlled in the narrow formal economies of SSA. Equally there is a similarly sized, statistically significant but negative relationship between underpricing and legal origin. This infers that underpricing is more prevalent in English common law countries than their civil code law counterparts which is intuitively expected from Levine (2005) and La Porta et al (2008) who cite external as opposed to internal financing of firms, and specifically market-orientated external financing is generally less developed in civil code law countries than their common law counterparts.
Finally there is a large, positive and statistically significant relationship between underpricing and the natural logarithm of shares offered to total shares issued by IPO firms. This indicates that underpricing is typically sensitive to the size of share issues. Table 5 4.3. The impact of board composition on underpricing
The evidence from Table 5 reveals considerable differences in board composition and the resulting effect on underpricing. There are large, negative and statistically significant relationships between number of foreign and also number of OECD origin directors and underpricing, at both 2 and 4 weeks, although the former relationship is significant at a 75% confidence level while the latter is significant at a much higher 95% confidence margin. This would be intuitively expected and is consistent with hypotheses 4 and 5 owing to foreign directors bringing with them both expertise and established business networks to assist the growth and development of the firm. However it is also likely because foreign directors act to align the interests of both investors and incumbent management thereby mitigating agency costs and asymmetric information. In direct contrast there is a large, positive and statistically significant relationship between number of indigenous high society directors and underpricing although this is at a meagre 75% confidence margin. This would indicate that the neoclassical market institutions would put a price premium reflecting the likely higher asymmetric information and misalignment of interests between investors and incumbent management which would be especially prevalent given the predominance of informal institutions within which the IPO firms are embedded which have largely alien African values adhering to ubuntu-type philosophy (Rossouw (2005) ; West (2006)).
Generally the relationships between control variables and underpricing are in line with those reported in preceding section in respect of board structure and governance mechanisms. However there are some notable differences with legal origin dummy lacking statistical significance at any discernable confidence level in models 7 to 10 which relate foreign and OECD directors to underpricing. Equally the firm level control for natural logarithm of revenues is large, positive and statistically significant, albeit at a meagre 75% confidence level across all models 7 to 12. Table 5 
Conclusions
This study investigates the structure and composition of IPO firm boards of directors and the resulting effects on underpricing determined by essentially neoclassical market institutions.
This drew on a unique and comprehensive sample of sixty two IPO firms from across SSA equity markets is collected for the period 2000 to 2009.
We have found considerable evidence that the internationally accepted Anglo- (1) The data have been sourced manually from the last prospectus lodged with the relevant securities exchange or national regulator immediately prior to listing.
All financial variables are expressed either as ratios or in thousands of US dollars. Firm age is measured in years between inception and IPO date.
(2) * Significant at 10% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; † Significant at 1% confidence level; † † Significant at 0.5% confidence level Table 5 . The impact of director characteristics on underpricing Regression models are unbalanced panel OLS regressions relating control variables and board characteristics to underpricing at 2 and 4 weeks. Director characteristics are defined as the number of OECD, Foreign and local indigenous high society directors respectively. Industry effects take value of 1 of IPO firm is in Basic Materials and Construction and 0 otherwise. Firm control variables are natural logarithm of firm revenues in year pre-IPO (in US$) and natural logarithm of firm age, itself the difference between foundation and listing date. IPO characteristics are defined as natural logarithm of shares offered at IPO to total outstanding shares (issued and fully paid up obtained from IPO prospectuses). Legal controls are the legal origin dummy taking value 1 if civil code law and 0 for English common law. 
Directors
